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In 1908, Dr. Charles Wardell Stiles, Chief of Zoology for the 
United States Public Health and Marine Hospital Service, visited 
Columbia, South Carolina. The stop was part of a fact finding mission 
dispatched to the southern United States to determine the etiology of 
indolence; the so-called "disease of the cracker," widely blamed for 
the long-term economic malaise in the postbellum South. If hunting 
for the "germ of laziness" seemed a laughable notion, the credentials 
of the well-connected Connecticuter and European-educated acolyte 
of Pasteur certainly were not. Stiles was widely considered the 
nation's foremost expert on hookworm disease and was no stranger 
to the South by 1908. Indeed, he was an anomaly to the uneasy 
egoism of the New South; he represented a rare sort of progressive 
Yankee expert, never deriding Southerners for their perceived 
backwardness, but rather, demonstrating a heartfelt desire to do 
whatever was in his power to alleviate rural and small-town misery. 
During his many visits, Southern newspaper editors and local 
politicians came to know him and looked forward to his calls, offering 
what support they could to his cause. 1 
In short order, Stiles positively identified hookworm in some 
twenty-four local townspeople, most of whom were being uselessly 
treated for anemia. However, a new scourge dominated the fears of 
the area-pellagra.z Symptomatically similar to hookworm 
infestations, characterized by eczema, yellowish skin, and a distended 
stomach, pellagra also visibly marked its sufferers with peculiar skin 
eruptions on the arms, feet, and around the neck and face. Unlike 
1 F. G. Brooks, Charles Wardell Stiles, Intrepid Scientist Bios, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Oct., 1947): 
1S7-160, 164-165 04/19/2012 
2 The State, "Investigating the "Hook Worm" the Parasite Which Causes Shiftlessness. 
Pellagra Also Found," Oanuary 7, 1908):9 
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hookworm, caused by the already-identified parasitic roundworms 
Necator americanus (first identified by Stiles) and Ancylostoma 
duodenale,3 pellagra, a long-standing disease of the European poor, 
had no certain causative agent. Upon pellagra's arrival in America, 
Southern news men were quick to correlate the two maladies, likening 
a possible parasitic cause for pellagra, a disease popularly connected 
with the European agricultural poor, to that of the hookworm 
outbreak. Soon, various theories of parasitosis infested local 
newspapers. Even as Stiles continued his investigations, The State 
(Columbia, South Carolina) posited the consumption of maize infested 
with weevils, "which find their way into the human stomach and 
burrow into the muscles," as a possible cause. 4 This possible 
association between hookworm disease, an ailment linked with the 
lack of proper sanitation in the South, and pellagra, a disease 
synonymous with poverty, led the Rockefeller Foundation to create 
the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission. In 1909, an endowment of 
$1,000,000 was disbursed to fund an investigation of the problem.s 
Stiles, the scientific secretary for the commission, was soon 
confronted by the high hopes of an uninformed public that the anti-
parasitic thymol treatment for hookworm might be the panacea for 
pellagra as well. 
Perhaps the death-by-weevil supposition of The State was a 
bit far flung, but not so far as the idea presently seems. The turn of 
the twentieth century was marked by a geometric growth in medical 
knowledge, which in turn, spawned a renaissance in medical thought. 
The breakdown of millennia-held humoural and miasmatic theories 
left a gaping hole in the bastion of the medical sciences and new 
theories, approaches, and practices flooded the breach. A surprising 
number of these new sciences proved their mettle over the forty years 
3 http:/ /www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001653/ (accessed 04/19/2012) 
4 Ibid. 
5 Elizabeth W. Etheridge, Butterfly Caste, Wesport, Connecticut (Greenwood Publishing 
Company:1972)13; F. G. Brooks, "Charles Wardell Stiles, Intrepid Scientist" Bios, Vol. 
18, No. 3 (Oct., 1947), 164. 
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between 1880 and 1920: viruses such as yellow fever were identified 
and equated with insect vectors, as was the protozoan responsible for 
malaria; the cholera bacterium, Vibrio cholerae, was identified in 
contaminated drinking water; Mycobacterium tuberculosis was 
isolated and its mode of transmission described. Even if outright 
cures for such afflictions remained evasive, the widespread 
application of preventative measures became possible for the first 
time ever. Pellagra, described in European medical literature since 
the eighteenth century, was not immune to these speculative 
vicissitudes. Indeed, conjecture became pellagra's greatest 
collaborator. Its unproven etiology spawned a raging and 
dichotomous argument amongst social and scientific theorists. Upon 
its discovery in America, new investigators reacted vigorously and 
swiftly, initially confident that they would solve the puzzle in a few 
years at most,6 only to find themselves stuck fast in the dogmas of 
their personal fields. The rise of pellagra in America is not a story of 
epidemiological conquest, but rather, a story of intellectual conflict, 
made all the more tragic because the solution to the problem was 
known, if not understood, by nearly every party involved. 
Pellagra was indeed a frightening disease, its symptoms 
described by period authors as the three D's: dermatitis, diarrhea, 
and dementia.? The most prominent symptoms of pellagra were 
dermatological-burn-like eruptions on the face, the tops of the 
hands and feet, forearms, and around the neck. In essence, these 
markers appeared any place where sunlight made normal contact. 
Before, during, following, or sometimes in the absence of the skin 
eruptions,a sundry gastronomical conditions arose-loss of appetite, 
6 South Carolina State Board of Health, "Transactions of National Conference on Pellagra 
Held Under Auspices of South Carolina State Board of Health at State Hospital for the 
Insane, Columbia, S.C. November 3 and 4 , 1909," Columbia, S.C.( The State Co.: 191 0) 
19. 
7 Daphne A. Roe, A Plague of Corn, Ithaca, New York (Cornell University Press: 1973)3. 
s George M. Niles, Pellagra: An American Problem, Philadelphia (W. B. Saunders 
Company: 1912) 88. The concept of pellagra-sine-pellagra or pseudo-pellagra was a 
105 
ulcerated mouth, cramps, diarrhea, constipation, and bloody stool 
were are all common markers. Adding complexity to the mystery was 
pellagra's seasonal nature, seeming to increase in spring, ebb during 
high-summer, resurge in the fall, and disappear in winter. Although 
in many cases, pellagrous delirium, the third D, set in at once, for 
some victims, many seasonal eruptions might pass before the 
neurological symptoms associated with the disease set in. Marked by 
forgetfulness, depression, fantasies of persecution, and suicidal 
tendencies, the neurological symptoms of pellagra turned many 
underfunded state institutions, particularly in the American South 
where pellagra was most prevalent, into ill prepared nexuses for the 
seasonally mad.9 If the three D's were insufficient in their fearsome 
rages, over time many physicians augmented the list with a fourth D: 
death. 10 During the thirty year reign of pellagra in America, death 
seemed to be the inevitable result for forty to seventy percent of 
those diagnosed. 11 
Today, it is understood that pellagra is a nutritional deficiency 
disease caused by a diet lacking in niacin, commonly called vitamin 
B3. Ironically, the chemical structure of niacin had been understood 
much disputed topic in both Europe and America; see also Daphne A. Roe, A Plague of 
Corn, 67. 
9 Botho Sheube. The Diseases of Warm Countries, Edited by James Cantlie, Translated 
by Pauline Falcke, LondonUohn Bal, Sons & Danielsson, Ltd., 1903)314-315; J. W. 
Babcock and W. Cutting jr, Prevalence of Pellagra, Washington (Government Printing 
Office: 1911) 1 7; 
10 E. W. Patterson, "The Treatment of Pellagra," The journal of the American Osteopathic 
Association, Vol. 14, No. 6 (Feb. 191 5), 284-287, p. 287 Accessed 04/07/2012. 
11 Carl Voegtlin, "Recent Work on Pellagra," Public Health Reports (1896-1970), Vol. 35, 
No. 25 Uune 18, 1920), 1435-1452, p. 1437. Accessed 04/05/2012.; J. G. Wilkinson, 
"Pellagra-Symptoms, Diagnosis and Treatment," Southern Medica/journal, vol. 4 no. 8 
(September 1911) 609; Daphne A. Roe, A Plague of Corn, 78, 88; Etheridge, The 
Butterfly Caste, 6; C. W. Garrison, "Economic Aspects of Pellagra" Southern Medical 
}ournalvol. 21 no. 3 1928. Dr. C. W. Garrison stated that by 1928, pellagra mortality in 
Arkansas had reached 85-90%; Sheube simply notes prognosis as "generally 
unfavourable." Sheube, The Diseases of Warm Countries, 320; Illinois Pellagra 
Commission. Pellagra in Illinois: Condensed Report, Chicago (American Medical 
Association: 1912)7. 
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since the 1870s (the first major vitamin to be synthesized) and the 
vitamin isolated by 1911, a scant four years after pellagra's first 
known appearance in America. However, the nutritional functions 
performed by niacin were only nominally studied until the 1930s. In 
fact, until the 1920s, no nutritional deficiency diseases at all were 
understood except in the most general terms, i.e. specific foods 
added to marginal diets seemed to prevent certain diseases. By the 
time pellagra was discovered to be active in America, the weapon for 
its speedy defeat had been in hand for nearly forty years, but nobody 
knew to use it, nor would they for nearly two more decades. 12 
Perhaps the strangest impediment facing American pellagra 
researchers was that the disease was not a new phenomenon, but 
rather, was merely new to America. Pellagra was first observed some 
1 70 years before its American visitation by the Spanish physician, Dr. 
Gaspar Casal, for whom one of its dermatological symptoms, "Casal's 
collar," is named. Concluding that the disease was prevalent in 
several impoverished provinces in Spain, Casal devoted the lion's 
share of his remaining years to studying the disease. It is noteworthy 
that Casal, unable to provide a definite cause, though he believed the 
maize-intensive diet of the poor responsible, was able to deduce that 
the addition of milk, cheese and meat to the diet improved pellagrous 
conditions and prevented further outbreaks. Following the 
posthumous publication of Casal's life work, the Historia natural y 
medicia de el Principado de Asturias in 1759, other physicians began 
noticing similar maladies among the rural poor throughout Europe.n 
Pellagra went by many regional names such as mal de Ia rosa , mal el 
monte, mal de Ia Teste, and flema sa/ada, before being conclusively 
linked together as the same disease by the French physician 
Theophile Roussel in 1861. Roussel opted for a single name, pellagra, 
12 Richard D. Semba, "The Historical Evolution of Thought Regarding Multiple 
Micronutrient Nutrition," The journal of Nutrition, vol. 142, no. 1 (January 2012) 1445. 
13 Roe, A Plague of Corn, 30-31; Arturo Warman, Corn & Capitalism: How a Botanical 
Bastard Grew to Global Dominance, Translated by Nancy L. Westrate, Chapel Hill 
(University of North Carolina Press: 2003)132-133. 
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coined earlier by Dr. Francisco Frapolli, in 1771. 14 The etiology of 
this now clearly defined and wide-spread ailment, long a source of 
heated debate among European physicians, grew increasingly 
contentious as the numbers of the diagnosed swelled. In time, the 
European debate settled into two camps, those of the Zeists and the 
anti-Zeists. This dichotomous situation would come to dominate the 
research of American physicians just as it had their European peers, 
an argument that worked to the detriment of pellagrins on both 
continents. 1s 
The Zeist theory, as originally promulgated in 1 81 0 by the 
Italian Dr. Giovanni Battista Marzari, held that maize was in some way 
related to pellagra, hence the term Zeist, derived from the maize 
genus Zea. However, Marzari blamed the disease principally on 
poverty, believing it neither hereditary nor contagious. Presciently, 
Marzari also contended that any diet so restricted as that of the rural 
Italian poor was likely to cause the infection. As the century 
progressed, nutritional studies seemed to confirm Marzari's theories, 
maize having been found very low in protein, widely believed to be 
the key nutritional element. 16 Unfortunately, there was one hole in 
Marzari's theory; the rural poor had always had a monotonous, high-
14 A. Marie, Pellagra, Translated by C.H. Lavinder and J.W. Babcock, Columbia, South 
Carolina (The State Co. Publishers: 191 0) 19-20. Marie stated that the name pellagra 
was a vernacular term used by farmers living in central Lombardi and Milan. Pellagra is 
derived from pelle -"skin" and agra -"rough."; Daphne A. Roe, Plague of Corn, 34-35, 
37; Arturo Warman. Corn & Capitalism: How a Botanical Bastard Grew to Global 
Dominance, 133; a more complete list of synonyms is provided in Sheube; Botho 
Sheube, The Diseases of Warm Countries, 311. 
1s Pellagra was also ravaging North Africa by the 1890s, but the English epidemiologist 
Dr. Fleming Sandwith seemed the only interested party. Sandwith's expertise, however, 
proved pivotal for the American study of pellagra as it was primarily through his efforts 
that any English language literature on the subject was available at all. See Daphne A. 
Roe, Plague of Corn, p. 69-76, for Sandwith's experiences in Egypt. 
16 Arturo Warman. Corn & Capitalism: How a Botanical Bastard Grew to Global 
Dominance, 133-135; Renato Mariani-Costantini and Aldo Mariani-Costantini. "An 
Outline of the History of Pellagra in Italy," journal of Anthropological Sciences, Vol. 85 
(2007) 167; www.isita-org.com. (Accessed 04/23/12). 
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starch diet. If a low protein dietary was the cause, how had pellagra 
not been noticed much earlier? Under the guidance of Dr. Lodovico 
Balardini, the Zeist theory matured at the Italian Scientific Congress of 
1844. Likening pellagra to ergot, Balardini posited that the true 
cause of the malady was neither poverty nor maize, but rather, a toxic 
fungal infestation of improperly stored maize or flour. Following in 
Balardini's footsteps, Zeist theorists unsuccessfully attempted to 
isolate the mysterious intoxicant, referred to as pellagrozeina, well 
into the next century. 17 
The anti-Zeist camp reflected the opinions of a range of 
naysayers rather than a single, cohesive theory. Indeed, the 
arguments among their own ranks were often as rancorous as their 
debates with the Zeists. Essentially, as noted by W. Bayard Cutting, 
American vice council in Milan in 1908, the anti-Zeists fell into two 
categories. The first, primarily economists and social activists, held 
firm to Marzari's original theory, believing pellagra a disease wholly 
caused by poverty, the maize argument seeming to them 
not so much false as inadequate ... it appears in 
districts where corn is either not cultivated or 
constitutes only a small part of the peasant's diet. In 
France, the inhabitants of the Landes used to eat corn, 
but other grains as well, and in far larger quantities. 
Even in Italy, some of the largest corn-growing 
districts have the least pellagra, or none at all. 1s 
17 Babcock and Cutting, Prevalence of Pellagra, 19-20. The term pellagrozeina was 
coined by the physician/psychologist Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909), likely the most 
respected and published zeist theorist. Lombroso's influence over time caused many 
publications to cite the maize-toxin theory simply as "Lombroso's Theory." 
Lombroso's Darwinian psychological theories regarding the physiognomy of criminals 
were also lent in support of heredity as a predisposing condition of pellagrins. See 
Daphne A. Roe, Plague of Corn, 59, 63. 
1s Babcock and Cutting, Prevalence of Pellagra, 20. 
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The second anti-Zeist camp included traditional miasmatic theorists 
following the teachings of the eighteenth century physician Pierre 
Thouvenel, who contended that contaminated vapors lifted from 
pools of torpid water, spreading the disease among the poor. Several 
more modern concepts concerned unseen germs. Other anti-Zeists 
implicated the generally filthy and miserable living conditions of the 
poor, referring to the phenomenon as morbus miseriae. 19 Among the 
most modern, and best received, of the anti-Zeist theories was that of 
the English entomologist Louis Sambon, whose investigations of 
pellagrous Italian districts in 1900, led him to conclude that the 
disease was caused by a microorganism spread by biting-flies of the 
Simulium genus.2o Sambon's insect vector theory was considered by 
many publications as the most likely cause of pellagra well into the 
1920s.21 
All of this, however, received little attention from physicians in 
the pellagra-free United States. Naturally, news articles with fearful 
headlines occasionally drifted into nineteenth century American 
newspapers. But such anecdotes as an 1 881 Chicago Daily Inter 
Ocean article about the ongoing epidemic in Italy, "The Terrible 
Pellagra," also tended to emphasize the different "soil, climate, race, 
social regulations, manners, and customs" of the victims, implying 
that the century-long scourge resulted in some way from the 
ltalianness of the sufferers rather than the maize they consumed. 22 
Whether bitten by the ethnocentric media-bug or not, American 
physicians had no experience and only scant knowledge of pellagra. 
One of the better sources available to American physicians was a 
translated German text, Dr. Botho Sheube's, the Diseases of Warm 
Countries (1 903), which offered a fair diagnostic of pellagra and a 
typical range of Zeist-preferred treatments including salt-baths, 
19 Roe, A Plague of Corn, 65-67; Sheube, The Diseases of Warm Countries, 311. 
20 Roe, A Plague of Corn, 84-86. 
21 G. Howard Bailey, The Etiology of Pellagra, 3; A. Marie, Pellagra, 1 39-141. 
22 "The Terrible Pellagra," The Daily Inter Ocean, no. 1 31 (August 1881 ). 
110 
appropriate dietary changes, and arsenical treatments.23 In her 1972 
retrospective of the pellagra years, The Butterfly Caste, Dr. Elizabeth 
Etheridge asserts that most American medical texts failed to mention 
pellagra at all, or at best, provided brief accounts of the strange and 
foreign ailment. For Americans, pellagra was simply another exotic 
affliction for Old World peasants and savages.24 
Pellagra remained an Old World disease until 1907 when a 
definitive diagnosis was made by Dr. George H. Searcy, following an 
investigation of an unknown epidemic spreading among the patients 
at the Alabama Institution for Negroes. Of the eighty-eight cases so-
diagnosed, fifty-seven died. 2s Soon after, the journal of the American 
Medical Association published Searcy's findings, detailing the course 
of the disease. Following the publication, many American physicians 
began looking back on some of the more puzzling cases they had 
encountered over their years of practice.26 As stated by Dr. J. W. 
Babcock, Physician and Superintendent of the State Hospital for the 
Insane in Columbia, South Carolina, the realization quickly grew that 
pellagra had "probably occurred in general practice, and especially in 
asylums and hospitals, for the last half-century, although the 
diagnosis may not have always been correctly made."27 
The initial reaction of the American medical community to the 
arrival of pellagra was marked by a frantic search for information. 
23 Sheube. The Diseases of Warm Countries, 314-318, 320-321. 
24 Etheridge, Butterfly Caste, 4. Etheridge cites examples from Flint's A Treatise on the 
Principles and Practices of Medicine (1866-1 894), Musser's A Practical Treatise on 
Medical Diagnosis (1904), and Osler's The Principles and Practice of Medicine (1892-
1909). With the exception of English translations of Scheube's Diseases of Warm 
Countries (1903), I found Etheridge to be correct. Standards such as Vierordt's 
(translated by Stuart) Clinical Textbook of Medical Diagnosis (1892) make no mention; 
indeed, even later publications such as Cole's 1913 Mental Diseases. . . frequently 
offer only a paragraph or so of information, Cole noting that "occasional examples have 
been reported in Scotland and in this country." 
2s Etheridge, Butterfly Caste, 4; Roe, A Plague of Corn, 78-79 
2s Etheridge, Butterfly Caste, 5. 
27 Babcock and Cutting, Prevalence of Pellagra, 1 0. 
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Among the first physicians to grasp the importance of the Alabama 
outbreak was the aforementioned Dr. j. W. Babcock. Using his 
personal friendship with South Carolina Senator james W. Tillman as a 
lever, in 1908 Babcock requested and received a synthesis of 
European statistics and thinking about the disease in the form of a 
consular report compiled by W. Bayard Cutting, American vice council 
in Milan. Babcock attached Cutting's informative report detailing the 
frightening pervasiveness of pellagra in Italy to his own investigations 
of pellagra's domestic incidence. In 1910, both documents were 
published together as the "Prevalence of Pellagra in the United 
States," first by the Journal of the South Carolina Medical Association 
and several months later as a public document disseminated by order 
of the United States Senate. Citing initial estimates of 1 ,000 victims 
spread over thirteen southern states, with over half the cases lodged 
in insane asylums, as grossly inaccurate, Babcock produced tables 
indicating that at least 3,000 sufferers were spread out over thirty-
four states and the District of Columbia.2s Moreover, noting that "it is 
no surprise for us to find, in running down one case, four or five 
additional cases in the same house," Babcock conservatively posited 
that the real number was likely 5,000 or more. Equally disconcerting, 
Cutting's donation to the document noted that the most compelling 
European scientific contributions to the issue were "insusceptible of 
direct proof and of direct disproof," and the popular European social 
critiques were "almost too indefinite to criticize." Cutting asserted 
the argument in toto as "little more than a criticism."29 If American 
physicians were hoping for any meaningful input from European 
expertise, they were sadly mistaken-all they had to go on was 
European clash and criticism. 
More than any other voice, j. W. Babcock drew attention to 
pellagra in America. Impugning his own practice in The Prevalence of 
Pellagra by declaring that "I know now that I should have made the 
28 Babcock and Cutting, Prevalence of Pellagra, 1 0; Niles, Pellagra: An American 
Problem, 27-31. 
29 Babcock and Cutting, Prevalence of Pellagra, 7-9, 20-21. 
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diagnosis of pellagra in South Carolina nearly nineteen years ago," 
Babcock invited a response to the problem: "Shall we not learn a 
lesson therefrom and hereafter be on the alert for other so-called 
tropical diseases?"3o Babcock's early bravery in vocally arousing 
concern over pellagra should not be underestimated. As Physician 
and Superintendent of the State Hospital for the Insane (Columbia, 
South Carolina), Babcock was the party most responsible for the 
health and welfare of his patients. Moreover, many powerful voices, 
such as Josephus Daniels, the editor of the strongly pro-New South 
Raleigh News & Observer (Raleigh, North Carolina), were already 
expressing anger over the growing national ridicule lately heaped on 
the South over hookworm; Daniel's writing that "many of us in the 
South are getting tired of being exploited by advertisements that 
exaggerate conditions . . . Let us not canonize Standard Oil 
Rockefeller by putting laurels on his head because he seeks to buy 
the appreciation of the people whom he has been robbing for a 
quarter of a century."3 1 Obviously, an additional association with a 
distressing disease of poverty was the last thing anybody wanted. 
Unfortunately, as the disease spread to affect some 1 6,000 people in 
eight Southern states by 1911, the South became popularly derided 
as "the land of hookworm and pellagra."32 Although no criticism 
seems to ever have been leveled at Babcock, or Superintendent Dr. 
George Zeller, similarly opening the doors of his Peoria State Hospital 
3o Babcock and Cutting, Prevalence of Pellagra, 10 
31 William j. Cooper Jr. and Thomas E. Terrill, The American South: A History, Volume II, 
New York (Rowman & littlefield: 2009) 614. Daniels was quite well connected, 
becoming Secretary of the Navy under Wilson and Ambassador to Mexico under 
Franklin Roosevelt. His negative critique of the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission, 
however, fails to mention that over one million southerners were ultimately examined 
and 440,000 of them freely treated. 
32 William J. Cooper Jr. and Thomas E. Terrill, The American South: A History Volume II, 
615; Southern fears of this stigma were well founded. The conceptual "land of 
Hookworm and Pellagra" outlasted the prevalence of both diseases, regularly being 
plied against the South at least into the 1950s. A fine example can be found in the 
song "I Wanna Go Back to Dixie" by Tom Lehrer. Tom. Lehrer, "I Wanna Go Back to 
Dixie," Songs by Tom Lehrer, 1953. 
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in Illinois to outside investigators in 1909, doing so clearly imperiled 
their professional reputations.33 
With several cities and counties having been proven endemic 
to pellagra, the strongest initial response from the scientific 
community came from the 1909-1912 Illinois Pellagra Commission, 
primarily studying at George Zeller's Peoria asylum.34 Many of the 
Illinois researchers, such as Drs. W. J. MacNeal, Henry Nichols, and 
Joseph Siler became synonymous with the pellagra investigations that 
followed for the next two decades.3s With no information beyond 
European theories to start them off, the Illinois commission's avowed 
initial efforts were set toward disentangling European thoughts on 
pellagra: 
With regard to the etiology of pellagra numerous 
views have been promulgated and it is well to say that 
the members of this commission entered on this study 
without prejudice or preconceived ideas with regard to 
the nature of the disease or its causation. The plans 
on which the work has been organized have been 
aimed toward the consideration of all the manifold 
theories which have evolved in order, if possible, to 
33Daphne A. Roe, A Plague of Corn, 88. 
34 Pellagra in Illinois: Condensed Report of the Illinois Pellagra Commission, 6-7, B. It is 
also noteworthy that the State of Illinois was far better equipped to fund such research 
than any of the more seriously impacted Southern states. 
35 Pellagra in Illinois: Condensed Report of the Illinois Pellagra Commission, cover 
sheet. Interestingly, sitting on the board of the Illinois Pellagra Commission was Dr. 
Howard T. Ricketts, noted for his discovery of the Rickettsiaceae family of bacterium. 
Not long after, Ricketts died from typhus contracted incidental to his research on that 
disease. The presence of Dr. Ricketts and other noteworthy pathologists on the ground 
floor of American pellagra research indicates the seriousness which State governments 
(and soon after, the Federal) assigned to the disease. A professional relationship with 
Ricketts may also correlate to W. J. MacNeal's relentless pursuit of a sanitation related 
cause to pellagra. 
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narrow down the lines of research into some more or 
less definite channel. 36 
However, on the very same introductory page of their report, the 
commission discarded nearly the entire Zeist argument, alluding to 
the failures of Zeist-inspired Italian government programs and 
paraphrasing the Simulium vector theorist Louis Sambon's snide 
comment that "the Italians have been studying corn rather than 
pellagra."37 Thus, several of America's top researchers determined at 
once that a biological agent of some sort was responsible for the 
disease; a dictum preordained to cause argument. Polarization set in 
quickly as American pathologists became embroiled in debates, each 
doggedly pursuing his theory to the near-exclusion of all others. An 
early example of this unfortunate tenacity took place in the search for 
an enteric cause of pellagra. Likely inspired by the gastric anomalies 
symptomatic to pellagra, the most promising early Illinois research 
centered around Dr. Henry Nichols' search for intestinal diseases. 
Theorizing protozoan infections as a likely predisposing condition to 
pellagra, in 1909, Nichols scrutinized and cultured stool samples 
from 88 pellagrins at Peoria State Hospital against a control group of 
101 presumably healthy patients. Although 85.3 per cent of the 
pellagrous samples proved positive for parasites, so too did 48.6 per 
cent of the control group. An outside control group of 453 soldiers 
was added to the test. Neither pellagrous nor open to any exposure 
peculiar to the Peoria hospital, 51 .2 per cent of the soldiers tested 
similarly to the positive test group. Moreover, the varieties of 
intestinal flora discovered varied greatly between many of the 
subjects and too few were found in subsequent blood tests to be a 
discreet cause.3s Over the next three years, several more exhaustive 
36 Pellagra In Illinois: Condensed Report of the Illinois Pellagra Commission, 4. 
37 Ibid, 4. 
38 Pellagra in Illinois: Condensed Report of the Illinois Pellagra Commission, 28; Roe, A 
Plague of Corn, 87-88. 
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examinations ensued at different Illinois institutions. All shared 
similar results, leading the team to officially conclude in their 1912 
report that "in all probability, the majority of these organisms are 
non-pathogenic."39 However, Nichols remained unconvinced, 
maintaining his theory that the harmful effects of the intestinal 
parasites might offer an infectious conduit for a yet-to-be identified 
maize-toxin. 40 By doing so, his theory called into question the 
commission's oblique disavowal of the Zeist pellagrozeina theory. 
Moreover, Nichols left the possibility of enteric causality open and 
valuable time and resources were subsequently squandered by the 
recently formed Thompson-McFadden Pellagra Commission. 
Formed in 1912, the Thompson-McFadden Pellagra Commission 
represented the federal government's first foray into pellagra 
research, although it was largely funded through the private 
donations Col. Robert M. Thompson of New York and Mr. J. H. 
McFadden of Pennsylvania. Both men had been approached to this 
end by Dr. George M. Miller, president of the New York Post-Graduate 
Medical School. The contribution of the federal government was 
represented in the salaries of Dr. Philip E. Garrison of the U. S. Navy 
and Captain Joseph. F. Siler of the U. S. Army Medical Corps, formerly 
of the Illinois Pellagra Commission, as was Dr. W. J. MacNeal, 
representing the New York Post-Graduate Medical School. Henry 
Nichols was notably absent from the line-up. The commission was 
formed, in part, to investigate the disconcerting increase of pellagra 
in the general populations of several southern states. Siler and 
Garrison were to head up the direct investigations in Spartanburg 
County, South Carolina, a known pellagra hotspot, while McNeal 
would handle the biologic and pathologic investigations in New York. 
Two Department of Agriculture entomologists, A. H. Jennings and W. 
V. King, already searching for a pellagrous insect vector in South 
39 Pellagra in Illinois: Condensed Report of the Illinois Pellagra Commission, 30. 
4o Roe, A Plague of Corn, 87-88. 
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Carolina were also redirected to Spartanburg. 4 1 Many observations 
and conclusions from the commission's several annual progress 
reports are of particular interest, less for what was learned than for 
the singular logic with which the findings were interpreted. 42 
The Thompson-McFadden team was charged with two missions: first, 
to uncover any socioeconomic contributions to the spread of pellagra. 
Barring any significant findings, they were then to move on to 
epidemiologic investigation. However, the group discarded any 
serious socioeconomic studies out of hand, noting in their 1914 
Progress Report only that "in the majority of the cases (85 per cent.) 
economic conditions are poor and the disease is most prevalent 
among people of insufficient means," and moving on to loosely 
connect the observation to poor sanitation. 4 3 This is actually of little 
surprise, as all three of the principle members were bacteriologists, 
MacNeal, the group's de facto leader having taken a lecturing position 
in this study with the New York Post-Graduate Medical School in 
1911.44 There were some half-hearted attempts made to ascertain 
whether diet was a significant causal factor presented in the 191 5 
41 j. F Siler, P.E. Garrison and W. J. MacNeal, "Pellagra: A Summary of the First Progress 
Report of the Thompson-McFadden Pellagra Commission," In Pellagra [1}-1/1. First-
Third Report of the Robert M. Thompson Pellagra Commission of New York Post-
Graduate Medical School and Hospital, by New York Post-Graduate Medical School and 
Hospital, (1914) 3-4. 
42 The Thompson-McFadden reports were individually published documents 
disseminated upon each study's completion, generally in the Archives of Internal 
Medicine (AIM) or in the Journal of the American Medical Association OAMA). Each 
completed year from 1914-16, the commission issued an annual compilation of all 
their work in the form of an Annual Progress Report. This essay makes use of these 
annual reports rather than the individually published releases, so studies cited to a 
particular year were actually conducted in the preceding year. 
4 3 Siler, Garrison and MacNeal, "Pellagra: A Summary of the First Progress Report ... ," 
6-7. 
44 American Society for Microbiology, The Ward ). MacNeal Papers, 2012, 
http:/ /www.asm.org/asm/index.php/membership/the-ward-j.-macneal-
papers.html?title= The+Ward+ J.+Macneai+Papers (accessed 5 may, 2012). 
MacNeal, a full professor by 1912, went on to perform valuable penicillin research 
during WWII. Accessed 05/05/2012. 
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Progress Report, but the food studies were conducted solely by 
uniform census cards filled out by Spartanburg County pellagrins 
themselves and built around vague food quality judgments and 
whether particular foods were eaten daily as opposed to the 
quantities in which they were eaten. No direct observations of the 
pellagrins' diets were made by the Thompson-McFadden team 
members. Moreover, much of the limited information that was 
gathered was dismissed; grits, for example were disregarded entirely 
because the poll indicated a local preference for wheat flour. The 
most telling observation of the food study was a well-documented 
pellagra corollary. Since 85 per cent of the pellagrins were quite 
poor, animal protein featured only a meager portion their daily 
faire. 45 The dietary study was nonetheless adequate for the 
Thompson-McFadden Commission to determine that "the supposition 
that the ingestion of good or spoiled maize is the essential cause of 
pellagra is not supported by our study"46 and to dismiss dietary 
deficiency altogether as a possible cause. 
Confident that such European contentions as maize diets, the 
mythical pe//agrozeina toxin, and miserable poverty had been 
answered to, the Thompson-McFadden Commission moved on to 
epidemiological inquiry. The major foci of the work centered on the 
possibilities presented by the deplorable sanitary conditions of many 
of the mill villages in Spartanburg County. Noting in the 191 5 
Progress Report that that the twenty-eight villages with the highest 
rates of pellagra also seemed to have unscreened privies, the 
45 J. F Siler, P.E. Garrison and W. J. MacNeal, "A Statistical Study of the Relation of 
Pellagra to use of Certain Foods and to Location of Domicile in Six Selected Industrial 
Communities," In Pellagra [1]-111. First- Third Report of the Robert M. Thompson 
Pellagra Commission of New York Post-Graduate Medical School and Hospital, by New 
York Post-Graduate Medical School and Hospital (New York: 1915) 1 5-95, 17 
46 J. F Siler, P.E. Garrison and W. J. MacNeal, "Further Studies of the Thompson-
McFadden Pellagra Commission: A Summary of the Second Progress Report," In Pellagra 
[1]-111. First- Third Report of the Robert M. Thompson Pellagra Commission of New York 
Post-Graduate Medical School and Hospital, by New York Post-Graduate Medical School 
and Hospital (New York: 191 5) 1. 
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possibilities for bacterial contamination of food or for an insect vector 
to directly transmit the offending germ seemed likely. 
Beginning in June of 1912, the Department of Agriculture 
entomologists Jennings and King began their studies of possible 
insect vectors for the Thompson-McFadden Commission. A series of 
tests and questionnaires were designed to winnow down the list of 
likely contenders; ticks, lice, bed-bugs, cockroaches, horse-flies, 
fleas, mosquitoes, buffalo gnats (Simulium), house flies and stable 
flies (Stomoxys) were under consideration. The two realized at once 
that Sambon's choice of Simulium as a likely vector was couched in 
observations of the prevalence of pellagra among Italian farmers. The 
majority of the Spartanburg cases, however, were village dwelling 
mill-hands not likely to be in regular contact with the generally rural 
SimuliumY Jennings and King were able to eliminate many other 
candidates due either to their high local prevalence or lack thereof. 
Fleas, for example, were eliminated due to a surprising scarcity 
among the pellagrins, few of whom could afford to keep livestock, or 
even dogs. 4B In a truly masterful exhibition of deductive reasoning, 
several possible vectors were eliminated because of an etiological 
peculiarity of pellagra in Spartanburg, where the disease seemed to 
strike women, mostly housewives married to mill hands, some four 
times more than their husbands. 49 Eventually, the two settled on 
Stomoxys, or the stable fly, as the likely culprit. Unlike Simulium, 
Stomoxys was not a picky breeder and happily propagated anywhere 
that feces could be found. Furthermore, the stable fly was a daytime 
47 Alan H. jennings and V. W. King, "An Intensive Study of Insects as a Possible Etiologic 
Factor in Pellagra," In Pellagra [/]-111. First- Third Report of the Robert M. Thompson 
Pellagra Commission of New York Post-Graduate Medical School and Hospital, by New 
York Post-Graduate Medical School and Hospital (New York: 1914) 94-100. 
4s Ibid. 91 
49 J. F Siler, P.E. Garrison and W. J. MacNeal, "Pellagra: A Summary of the First Progress 
Report of the Thompson-McFadden Pellagra Commission," In Pellagra [1]-111. First-
Third Report of the Robert M. Thompson Pellagra Commission of New York Post-
Graduate Medical School and Hospital, by New York Post-Graduate Medical School and 
Hospital (New York: 1914), 5-6. 
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feeder known to frequently enter the unscreened windows of homes, 
often biting the wives of mill hands.so Logically, Stomoxys seemed 
the perfect culprit. However, like the already highly contested 
Simulium vector theory, no amount of blood testing was able to find a 
protozoa or bacterium common to both host and insect. 5 1 
Easily connected to the Stomoxys theory, but also attractive as 
a stand-alone means of transmission was the general filth associated 
the aforementioned open privies. Even without the stable fly, enough 
opportunities for food and water contamination were offered by the 
squalid sanitary situation to encourage a round of intensive blood and 
fecal surveys. From his lab at the New York Post-Graduate Medical 
School and Hospital, MacNeal picked up where his former colleague 
Nichols left off, performing an additional 2000 agglutination tests 
and isolating 693 bacterial strains, ultimately concluding that "there 
was no indication of a substitution of the normal intestinal bacteria by 
an abnormal invader. The abnormal types were various in nature and 
in no case dominant in numbers."s2 Undaunted by his negative 
findings, MacNeal summarized the commission's overall conclusions 
for 1912 through 1913 by announcing that pellagra, nonetheless, was 
"in all probability a specific infectious disease communicable from 
person to person ... we are inclined to regard intimate association in 
the household and the contamination of food with the excretions of 
pellagrins as possible modes of distribution of the disease."S3 These 
convictions, made in spite of extensive contrary evidence, were in 
part bolstered by observations made over the previous two years 
which indicated that the communities with the most primitive means 
5o jennings and King, "An Intensive Study," 1 00~ 110. 
51 Roe, A Plague of Corn, 87. 
52 W. J. MacNeal, "Observations on the Intestinal Bacteria in Pellagra," In Pellagra [1]-111. 
First- Third Report of the Robert M. Thompson Pellagra Commission of New York Post-
Graduate Medical School and Hospital, by New York Post-Graduate Medical School and 
Hospital (New York: 1914). 
53 Siler, Garrison and MacNeal, "Further Studies of the Thompson-McFadden," 1. 
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of sewage disposal were also those with the highest prevalence of 
pellagra. 54 
For the 1914 study-year, it was decided that the best means 
of testing this hypothesis was to install a modern sanitary disposal 
system in the town of Spartan Mills, "a conspicuous endemic center of 
pellagra for as long as the disease had been recognized in this 
region." The numbers of newly diagnosed cases in Spartan Mills had 
indeed increased steadily from five in 1909 to thirty in 1913; poor 
hygienic conditions along with the close contact between the sick and 
the healthy seemed the obvious cause. In August of 1913, 
construction began. By May of the following year, the entire town, 
except for six poorly situated homes, was connected to a modern 
sewage system. The six non-connected homes were equipped with 
"fly-proof pail closets" and the town's older privies were knocked 
down and carted away. Over the following two years, the incidence of 
new pellagra cases did indeed decline, from thirty in 191 3 to only two 
in 1916. The team painstakingly interviewed the newly infected 
parties and in all cases was able to place them in close proximity with 
previously diagnosed pellagrins, either through familial connections 
or through visits with nearby friends. For example, Pellagrin 1377, 
stricken in June, 1916, lived across the street from Pellagrin 1356 
who seemed to have contracted the disease from her daughter, an 
established pellagrin (# 1167) with whom she was previously living. 
The 1916 numbers suggested that with modern sanitation and a little 
caution, the disease would soon fade away.ss 
54 j. F Siler, P.E. Garrison and W. j. MacNeal, "The Relation of Methods of Disposal of 
Sewage to the Spread of Pellagra," In Pellagra [1}-111. First- Third Report of the Robert M. 
Thompson Pellagra Commission of New York Post-Graduate Medical School and 
Hospital, by New York Post-Graduate Medical School and Hospital (New York: 1915): 
97. 
ss J. F Siler, P.E. Garrison and W. J. MacNeal, "The Relation of Methods of Disposal of 
Sewage to the Spread of Pellagra," In Pellagra [1}-111. First- Third Report of the Robert M. 
Thompson Pellagra Commission of New York Post-Graduate Medical School and 
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On the surface, it seems that the Thompson-McFadden 
Commission thoroughly tackled the pellagra problem and arrived at a 
reasoned etiological determinacy for pellagra. However, the structure 
of the theory was entirely framed in preconceived notions and 
unproven theories. For example, MacNeal, Siler and Garrison, 
bacteriologists one and all, only noted in a general way that the vast 
majority of the Spartanburg County pellagrins were very poor and that 
the food they could afford was limited in nature. Only the frequency 
of consumption for certain foods was tracked, not the quantities 
which were consumed. Furthermore, no consideration was given to 
the varied definitions applicable to the food consumed. For example, 
to the impoverished pellagrins, ''fresh meat" essentially meant pork 
fat, or at best, bacon. One of the most glaring considerations omitted 
from the food study was the peculiar prevalence of pellagra among 
the wives of the mill-hands. The best explanation for this 
inconsistency is that the wives saved the best and most plentiful 
portions of the daily repast for their husbands and children, not that 
they were any more regularly bitten by the ubiquitous swarms of 
Stomoxys at home than their husbands were at work.s6 But perhaps 
the commission's most egregious scientific sin was the use of an 
unproven human contagion hypothesis to verify the seemingly 
positive results of their sewage disposal test at Spartan Mills. The 
continuing, though reduced, incidence of new cases of pellagra was 
explained by contact with known pellagrins in the area-were pellagra 
a human contagion, the density of the population in the area would 
have been adequate to foster its spread alone, regardless of the 
sanitary upgrades. A far more likely explanation for the decline in 
Hospital, by New York Post-Graduate Medical School and Hospital (New York: 1917): 
155-166. 
ss Female mill-hands tended to demonstrate susceptibility roughly equal to that of the 
men. See J. F Siler, P.E. Garrison and W. j. MacNeal, "Pellagra: A Summary of the First 
Progress Report of the Thompson-McFadden Pellagra Commission," In Pellagra [/]-111. 
First- Third Report of the Robert M. Thompson Pellagra Commission of New York Post-
Graduate Medical School and Hospital, by New York Post-Graduate Medical School and 
Hospital (New York: 1914): 6. 
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pellagra incidence in Spartan Mills was the year-long economic 
infusion that the construction project offered to the local denizens. In 
short, the extra work provided additional earnings, likely spent to 
supplement their meager daily rations which were no longer being 
tracked by the commission. 
At around the time that the Thompson-McFadden Commission 
was razing the primitive privies of Spartan Mills, Surgeon General 
Rupert Blue, responding to requests from several southern 
Congressmen, commissioned the United States Public Health Service 
(PHS) to launch their own investigation. Because much of the then-
current epidemiological debate was divided between Sambon and 
Jenning's vector theories, the assignment was given to Dr. Joseph 
Goldberger, a relatively unknown PHS officer, likely chosen because 
his earlier work with yellow fever and tabardillo qualified him as an 
insect vector specialist.57 However, Goldberger proved quite different 
from his colleagues. Likened by Dr. joann Elmore, co-author of the 
textbook Epidemiology, Biostatistics and Preventative Medicine, as "an 
American John Snow," Goldberger entertained no predilections about 
pellagra at the onset of his studies. ss Indeed, Goldberger was a 
fearless researcher who thrice fell ill from the maladies he studied, 
contracting and surviving typhus, yellow fever, and dengue fever 
during his career. sg 
57 Roe, A Plague of Corn, 99. 
58 joann G.Eimore and Alvan R. Feinstein, '1oseph Goldberger: An Unsung Hero of 
American Clinical Epidemiology," The History of Medicine, (September 1, 1994: 372); 
University of Washington Department of Epidemiology (2008) 
http://depts.washington.edu/epidem/fac/facBio.shtmi?Eimore..Joann (accessed May 6, 
2012); Milton Terris, then-Professor of Preventative Medicine at New York Medical 
College and editor of a compendium of Goldberger's reports, Goldberger on Pellagra, 
made a similar comment in his introduction. See joseph Goldberger, Goldberger on 
Pellagra, ed. Milton Terris, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press; 1964): 5-6. 
59 Alan M. Kraut, Goldberger's War: The Life and Work of A Public Health Crusader, New 
York (Hill and Wang: 2003) 7. 
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Goldberger's first step was to critically analyze nearly two-
hundred years of literature, familiarizing himself with everything from 
the earliest work by Casal to the latest contributions by the 
Thompson-McFadden Commission. Taking Marzari's early-Zeist 
dietary critiques at face value, Goldberger considered the contributing 
role that a maize-only diet might play and studied the latest literature 
on scurvy and beriberi as well. Finally, Goldberger isolated an often 
noted, but little considered fact common to much of the literature: 
although many inmates develop pellagra after varying 
periods of institutional residence, some even after 1 0 
to 20 years of institutional life, and therefore it seems 
permissible to infer, as the result of the operation 
within the institution of the exciting cause or causes, 
yet nurses and attendants living under identical 
conditions appear uniformly immune. If pellagra be a 
communicable disease, why should there be this 
exemption of the nurses and attendants?GO 
There was only one clear answer to this question. Pellagra was 
neither communicable through close contact nor through an insect 
vector. Upon his earliest visits to various institutions and orphanages 
in Mississippi, Goldberger was further able to conclude that, since the 
attendants and inmates took their meals from the same trays in the 
same cafeterias, the likelihood of the disease resulting from the 
ingestion of contaminated food was remote. Apprehending that the 
attendants generally enjoyed first pick of the served dishes and the 
inmates portions were thus largely reduced to starches, Goldberger 
"gained the impression that vegetables and cereals form a much 
greater proportion" of the diets of the poor than "in the dietaries of 
well-to-do people; that is, people who are not, as a class, subject to 
pellagra." Pending further study, Goldberger's immediate suggestion 
60 Joseph Goldberger, ''The Etiology of Pellagra. The Significance of Certain 
Epidemiological Observations with Respect Thereto," Goldberger on Pellagra, ed. Milton 
Terris, Baton Rouge (Louisiana State University Press: 1964): 20. 
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was an improvement in the diets of the most susceptible Southern 
populations, in and out of institutions, including "a reduction in 
cereals, vegetables, and canned foods ... and an increase in the fresh 
animal food component, such as fresh meats, eggs, and milk."61 
Resisting the temptation to singularly follow his dietary theory 
without first following up on similarly compelling evidence that 
pellagra might be caused by an infection, Goldberger enlisted the 
services of C. H. Lavinder, Passed Assistant Surgeon of United States 
Public Health and Marine-Hospital Service to perform a series of 
communicability tests on rhesus monkeys. Goldberger described the 
experiments in his second progress report to the PHS, noting that 
"although every kind of tissue, secretion, and excretion from a 
considerable number of grave and fatal cases was obtained and 
inoculated in every conceivable way into over a hundred rhesus 
monkeys, the results have so far been negative." 62 Having satisfied 
himself for the moment that pellagra was non-communicable, 
Goldberger launched his first round of "Human Experiments" in two 
Mississippi orphanages and at the Georgia State Sanitarium in the 
summer of 1914. 
Understanding that the Mississippi and Georgia institutions 
were already grossly underfunded (and believing this a likely cause 
for pellagra therein) and would be unable to participate in the study 
otherwise, Goldberger secured additional funding from the PHS to 
defray the costs of additional and higher quality food. Beyond 
funding the studies, Goldberger also had to overcome concerns that 
pellagra was communicable, a fear made all the more real by the 
published suppositions of the Thompson-McFadden Commission. 
Motivated by these concerns, many institutions isolated pellagrins in 
61 Ibid, 21-22. 
62 Joseph Goldberger, "The Cause and Prevention of Pellagra," Goldberger on Pellagra, 
ed. Milton Terris, Baton Rouge (Louisiana State University Press: 1964): 24. Lavinder, 
though not a big part of this essay, was a major contributor to pellagra research 
throughout the entirety of its prevalent years in America 
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locked cells or quarantine wings. Thus, the three test sites were 
chosen based on their willingness to follow Goldberger's protocols for 
the proper management of pellagrins and secondly for their 
established histories as endemic centers for the disease. Two wards 
of the sanitarium patients and all of the children in the orphanages 
enjoyed better rations; oatmeal "replaced grits as the breakfast cereal 
and the allowances of fresh animal protein foods (milk, meat and, at 
the orphanage, eggs) and legumes was greatly increased. The 
allowance for maize was thus reduced but not abolished." By October 
of 191 5, toward the end of the first year of the study, out of 172 
orphans affected, only one retained any pellagrous symptoms. None 
of the 72 pellagrins tested at the Georgia State Sanitarium showed 
any signs of the disease at all. Conversely, almost half of the 
sanitarium's pellagrin control group continued suffering recurrent 
attacks from the disease.63 
Having demonstrated that a diet enriched with animal foods 
and generally reduced in carbohydrates seemed to cure pellagra, half 
of Goldberger's deficiency hypothesis seemed proven. Notably, 
Goldberger had also proven that maize alone was not culpable as a 
cause of pellagra. In order to complete his deficiency hypothesis, 
however, he would have to prove that a poor, excessively starchy diet 
actually caused the disease. Finding a group of people desperate 
enough to try out an experimental cure is one thing; finding a group 
of healthy people willing to be sickened is quite another. 
Goldberger's answer to this dilemma was found at Rankin Farm, one 
of the many gang-labor colonies operated by the Mississippi State 
Penitentiary System. Beginning in April of 191 5, twelve participants 
underwent a rigorously monitored dietary experiment in exchange for 
pardons to be granted them by Mississippi's Governor Earl Brewer 
63 joseph Goldberger, "Pellagra Prevention by Diet Amongst Institutional Inmates," 
Goldberger on Pellagra, ed. Milton Terris, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press: 1964): 45,46,47, 48-53. 
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{1912-1916).64 The Pellagra Squad members, as they came to be 
known, were not starved but to the contrary, were well fed by all 
appearances. A typical meal, served three times daily, included "fried 
mush, biscuits, rice, gravy, sirup [sic], coffee, sugar," or any number 
of other variations including sweet potatoes, grits, and gravy 
thickened with cornmeal. 65 The major difference between the control 
population diet and that of the Pellagra Squad essentially came down 
to a complete lack of "animal protein" in the latter.66 By the end of 
October, six of the volunteers had contracted pellagra, as verified by 
two outside physicians. The control group, as well as the general 
population of Rankin Farm, remained healthy.67 
Anxious to inform the public about the dietary cure for pellagra, 
Goldberger and the PHS contacted news outlets nationwide prior even 
to the causal experiments at Rankin Farms. This was not a 
spontaneous act on the part of the PHS, but rather, a reaction to a 
growing national fear of the disease for which the organization 
believed it had a cure. Goldberger's "cure" was published often within 
weeks or months of such articles as a December, 1912 New York 
Times piece putting national prevalence in excess of 50,000 victims; 
or another, published in October of 191 5 bleakly noting Surgeon 
General Rupert Blue's estimation of 1 00,000 victims across the 
nation. 68 The media reception was indeed warm. Papers across the 
nation judged Goldberger's triumph "epochal." The Biloxi Daily 
Herald and others circulated interviews with the celebrity scientist: "It 
is all so simple," said Dr. Goldberger, "that many people refuse to 
believe in our theory ... I have been flooded by letters from every 
64 jon M. Harkness, "Prisoners and Pellagra," Public Health Reports, vol. 111, no. 5 
(Sep.-Oct.: 1996): 463. 
65 Joseph Goldberger, "The Experimental Production of Pellagra in Human Subjects by 
Means of Diet," Goldberger on Pellagra, ed. Milton Terris, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press: 1964): 45, 46, 4 7. 
66 Ibid, 65, 69. 
67 Ibid, 72-73. 
6B The New York Times, "1 00,000 Cases of Pellagra," (October 10, 1915); The New York 
Times, "Put Cases in South at 50, 000," (December 3, 1912). 
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part of the South asking my advice as to what prescriptions to offer .. 
. I reply that it is a question of a balanced and proper diet. Now that 
all seems so simple some people want to laugh."69 
But others in the scientific community were not laughing, 
especially W. j. MacNeal of the Thompson-McFadden Pellagra 
Commission. Part of this resistance is understandable, even if it 
seems petty. These were among the best and brightest medical 
researchers in the world; if it were all so simple, they would have 
produced the same results in the same short amount of time. The 
first salvos from the Thompson-McFadden contingent came swiftly, 
MacNeal publicly accusing Goldberger of falsifying the results of the 
Rankin Farm experiment during a meeting at Belleview Medical 
School, Goldberger's alma materflO Writing to the journal of the 
American Medical Association OAMA) a year later, MacNeal challenged 
the accuracy of the Rankin Farm diagnoses as well as the reliability of 
Goldberger's outside medical verification. To the JAMA readership, 
MacNeal warned that "the claim that pellagra had been produced by a 
restricted diet should be regarded with suspicion and it would be well 
for those who have not yet acquired knowledge of this disease by 
personal observation or by a somewhat comprehensive study of its 
literature to retain an open mind concerning the essential factors of 
its causation." 71 ·Goldberger shot back that due to "the tone and 
personal character of MacNeal's criticism we have not felt that it 
required any special notice, preferring to let the record of our work 
69The Daily Herald, "Diet Cure of Pellagra Epochal, Is Opinion of Government Physician," 
America's Historical Newspaper, (September 9, 1914), 
http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iw-search/we/HistArchive .Accessed April 2, 2012. 
?o A Plague of Corn, 108. Roe cites this event to M. F. Goldberger, "Dr. Josef 
Goldberger: His Wife's Recollections," journal of the American Dietetic Association 32 
(1956): 724-727. I was unable to obtain a copy of this article for personal review. 
71 W. J. MacNeal, "Correspondence," The journal of the American Medical Association 
66, no. 13 (1916): 976-977. 
128 
speak for itself."72 With no middle ground between the camps, the 
ongoing European Zeist/anti-Zeist conflict fully emerged in the 
American medical community. 
The flames of the dispute, unfortunately, were fanned by 
certain questions left unanswered by Goldberger's theory. The most 
obvious of these detractions was that if pellagra was entirely the 
result of an impoverished diet, it seemed that nearly every 
sharecropper, tenant farmer, and urban laborer in the nation should 
have had the disease. Obviously, this was not the case. Instead, it 
was often pointed out, pellagra tended to arise among specific 
communities or in other limited geographic areas. Clearly, pellagra 
resulted not from indigence, but from infection. Goldberger's rigid 
association of pellagra with poverty was further undercut by story 
after story of well-heeled pellagrins. Typifying such stories are those 
of Dr. Toulmin Gaines of Mobile Alabama. Speaking out at the 1927 
annual meeting of the Southern Medical Association, Gaines described 
that "a lady in the best of circumstances and with proper diet lived 
next to an infirmary and was visited by one of the inmates who had 
pellagra. This lady developed an uncontrovertible case of pellagra." 
Gaines continued, telling the tale of a girl "from one of the best 
families in town" who was wont to associate with pellagrins, 
contracted the disease and died. 73 Naturally, the long-standing 
customs of doctor/patient confidentiality prevented such concerned 
medical men from proffering specific details! To the remarks of 
Gaines and others at the same meeting, Goldberger wearily replied, 
12 joseph Goldberger, "The Experimentral Production of Pellagra in Human Subjects by 
Means of Diet," In Goldberger on Pellagra, ed. Milton Terris, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press: 1964): 73. 
73 C. W. Garrison, "Economic Aspects of Pellagra," Southern Medical journal, vol. 21, no. 
3 (March 1928): 239. The argument of the 'well-heeled pellagrin' was very successfully 
bandied about well into the 1930s. The Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Encyclopedia 
for 1931 observing that, "The theory of a deficient diet as responsible for this disease 
has been partly exploded by the discovery that, in California and Louisiana, prosperous 
and well-nourished people had developed pellagra ... "Funk & Wagnalls, 458. 
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"What I have to say about pellagra I have already said, and it is in 
print. I would really appreciate it as a high compliment if some of you 
people who apparently differ from me would read what I have printed. 
Sometime ago, (probably two or three years 
ago) Dr. justine, of Boston, in a paper 
appearing in one of the journals reported on 
a very interesting case. He reported that 
somewhere in Massachusetts there was a 
house in which a family at one time lived and 
a member of the family developed diabetes. 
That family moved from that house; another 
family came and occupied it again. A case 
developed in this household. Another family, 
and again diabetes developed in this third 
family. I cannot recall how many generations 
of tenants moved in and out of this house, 
and each time at least one case of diabetes 
developed. This is exceedingly excellent 
evidence that diabetes is a highly 
communicable disease. 74 
Such mudslinging was by no means unusual; particularly as 
the majority of the public health forums regarding pellagra tended to 
take place where the disease posed the greatest problems-in the 
South. This regional importance also encouraged continuing 
resistance. Acutely aware of the Southern reputation as the "land of 
hookworm and pellagra," many Southern physicians adamantly 
refused admission that the malady correlated with poverty. To do so 
was tantamount to an admission of Southern backwardness. MacNeal 
used such provincialism to his advantage, commenting at a 1922 
symposium of the Southern Medical Association that Goldberger's 
"proposition has come from a source [the PHS] such as to give it wide 
74 Garrison, "Economic Aspects of Pellagra:" 239-240. 
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currency in the Northern portion of our country, where the physicians 
are generally less familiar with pellagra."7s Exactly how his own status 
as a full professor and lecturer at the New York Post-Graduate 
Medical School failed in offering MacNeal a similar measure of 
influence among Northern physicians is left for us to ponder. 
The schismatic debate of Goldberger and MacNeal aside, the 
lion's share of the American failure in dealing with pellagra lay in 
government inaction. Whether one espoused the theory that pellagra 
was a dietary deficiency disease of impoverished people, or an enteric 
disease caused by primitive public sanitation measures was 
immaterial. The actual issue was poverty and the unwillingness or 
inability of any organization of governance, be it local, state, or 
federal, to act on the problem. To be sure, various government 
agencies defended their inaction by using the apparent lack of 
certainty posed by the ongoing scientific argument. Typifying such 
schismatically induced government inertia, in 1921 President Warren 
G. Harding responded to a request from South Carolina 
Representative James F. Byrnes for federal support in dealing with the 
growing pellagra epidemic. Harding responded to the request in a 
letter dated July 28, 1921 and published in the New York Times two 
days afterward: 
While assuring you that I speak the views of our people 
in expressing gratitude to you for the generous spirit 
that prompted you to make this appeal for aid, I am 
confident in South Carolina there exists at this time no 
necessity for any greater cooperation on the part of the 
Public Health Service then is rendered at all times. And 
as the existence in South Carolina at this time of either 
a plague or a famine is an utter absurdity, there is no 
necessity for the Red Cross furnishing aid. Should the 
State ever be unfortunate enough to suffer a disaster 
7s W. J. MacNeal, ''The Infectious Theory of Pellagra," Sothern Medical)ourna/1 5, no. 11 
(November 1922): 899. 
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with which the people of the State cannot cope, we will 
gladly welcome aid and ask for it, but I think it would 
be unfortunate if the Red Cross is called upon to 
relieve a plague and a famine of which the people in 
South Carolina are unaware. 
Harding went on to suggest a full investigation of the problem, 
warning that "if these reports have misrepresented conditions in any 
part of the South ... a full and official refutation of them would be 
highly desirable."76 
Tragic in its absence, government follow-through on either 
Goldberger's or MacNeal's theories would have been of enormous 
public benefit. Any sizeable public sanitation effort in the South 
would unquestionably have saved a magnitude of victims from the 
ravages of hepatitis A and E, typhus, Legionellosis, and dysentery, to 
name but a few diseases. With our present understanding of its 
veracity, the benefits of acting upon Goldberger's theory would have 
been self-evident. Instead, pellagra's decline in America had almost 
nothing to do with direct government or scientific action. Ironically, 
the beginning of the end for pellagra was ushered in by the collapse 
of the Southern cotton economy during the Great Depression. The 
economic disaster forced many tenant farmers and sharecroppers off 
of their land and into urban areas. Many of those who stayed on the 
land were relieved of cotton-only planting requirements and their 
resulting crop debts, creating room for livestock and gardens. More 
and better nutrition opportunities arose for both of these beleaguered 
groups even as their actual earnings plummeted. This especially 
became the case in the 1 930s as New Deal labor programs such as 
the Civil Works Administration (CWA) and its sundry offspring 
provided earnings for millions of displaced American laborers. Tax 
dollars flowed into CWA sponsored public works and sanitary 
programs nationwide. MacNeal, no doubt, was beside himself. 
76 The New York Times, "Harding Favors Pellagra Inquiry," Uuly 30, 1921 ). 
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Finally, the mass population movements associated with the 
Second World War shut the door on pellagra completely. In the 
meantime, another New Deal bill, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
of 1 938 empowered the United States Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) to create standards of identity for the fortification of flour with 
a range of only recently understood nutritional components-
vitamins. Based on recommendations provided by the FDA, in 1943 
the War Food Administration promulgated Food Order Number 1, 
standardizing and requiring flour fortification with niacin, thiamin and 
riboflavin (the major B vitamins) and iron. 'Enriched flour' was 
officially born. Following the war, most states passed laws requiring 
maintenance of these expired wartime standards. 77 It became quite 
difficult for Americans to not get their daily dose of pellagra-
preventing niacin! Goldberger, dead since january of 1929, no doubt 
would have nodded in approval. 
In the end, it took the greatest economic disaster in modern history 
and the largest military conflict in human history to compel the 
United States government to act on the conflicting theories of 
Goldberger and MacNeal. Perhaps the only triumphs to be found in 
this story of scientific deadlock are that, right or wrong, both 
propositions were disseminated with the purest of intentions for the 
least represented of social classes. Furthermore, in spite of their 
egos and emphases, both the theorists and their theories demanded 
of an apathetic government a more active role in vouchsafing the 
health and welfare of all citizens-a role which the federal 
government eventually embraced, guided in part by the controversial 
ideals of joseph Goldberger and William j. MacNeal. 
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